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The Grounds for Excluding the Criminal Responsibility of 
the Offenders Committing an International Offense
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Al-Ahliyya Amman University Al Balqa Applied University
ramy_aburukba@hotmail.com moradshnikat@bau.edu.jo
The international community has been exerting much effort to set an effective mechanism for 
prosecuting and punishing the offenders who violate the international human rights law and 
other international laws. Eventually, after the United Nation exerted much effort, the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court was adopted in 1998. The latter statute came into force in 2002. Since 
2002, the offenders who commit genocides, crimes against humanity, and war crimes have been 
held criminally liable for their crime. Due to such statute, they are not exempted from punishment 
any more. In other words, there is not any immunity nor any kind of protection that may prevent the 
enforcement of punishment on those offenders. Establishing the Permanent International Criminal 
Court is a high significant step throughout human history to ensure that those offenders are prosecuted 
and punished. The significance of the present study arises from seeking to identify the reasons for 
excluding the criminal responsibility of offenders who committed international offenses requirements 
in accordance with the Statute of the Permanent International Criminal Court. This study also aimed 
at identifying the legal requirements that must be fulfilled to be implemented to set the legal effects 
and comparing them with those stated in the national criminal law.
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 ن ي�لوؤسملا صاخشألا ةقحلام اهللاخ نم نكمي ةيلآ داجيإ ليبس ي ن� ة ي�بك ًادوهج يلودلا عمتجملا لذب ممألا دوهج ترمثأ دقو ، يلودلا نوناقلاو ناسن إلا قوقحل ةميسجلا تاكاهتنلا باكترا نع مهتبقاعمو ،م1998 ماع ةيلودلا ةيئانجلا ةمكحملل يساس
ألا ماظنلا لىع عيقوتلا ي ن� فاطملا ةياهن ي ن� ةدحتملا
 ةداب إلا مئارج نوبكتري نمم صاخشألا دعي مل خيراتلا كلذ ذنمف ،م2002 ماع ذيفنتلا ن ي�ح هلوخدو
 نود ،باقعلا ةرئادو ةيئانجلا ةلءاسملا نع لزعم ي ن� برحلا مئارجو ةيناسن إلا دض مئارجلاو ةيعامجلا
 غلاب ًاثدح ب�تعي ةمئادلا ةيلودلا ةيئانجلا ةمكحملا ءاشنإف .ةيامحلا وأ ةناصحلا نم عون يأب دادتعلا
 داعبتسا بابسأ نع فشكلل ةيثحب ةلواحم اهنأب ةساردلا ةيمهأ ي ت�أت انه نمو .ةيناسن إلا خيرات ي ن� ةيمه
ألا
 ةيلودلا ةيئانجلا ةمكحملل يساس
ألا ماظنلل ًاقبط ةيلود مئارج اوبكترا نيذلا ةانجلل ةيئانجلا ةيلوؤسملا
 اهتنراقمو ،ةينوناقلا اهراثآ بيترت ي ن� اهب دادتعلال اهرفاوت بجاولا ةينوناقلا طو ش�لا ةفرعمو ،ةمئادلا
. ي ن�طولا ي أ�انجلا نوناقلا ي
ن� اهيلع صوصنملا كلتب
.ةيئانجلا ةيلوؤسملا عناوم ،ةيئانجلا ةيلوؤسملا ،ةيلودلا مئارجلا :ةيحاتفملا تاملكلا
Introduction
 An international offense is defined as an 
act that involves a violation of any right of the rights 
granted by the law. In this context, the term (law) re-
fers to the international criminal law. The latter law is 
responsible for protecting a right that is worth protec-
tion through enacting criminal provisions. Protecting 
such rights is a pillar that supports the stability and 
security of the international community(1).
 Prosecuting the ones who committed an 
international offense must be carried out by the In-
ternational Criminal Court. An international offense is 
defined as an act or failure of an act that matches 
the offense description that is mentioned in articles 
8, 7 and 6 of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. Such offenses may include genocides, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes. However, such an 
offense must be committed by someone of sound 
mind. It must be committed in the international set-
ting whether it is carried out as being part of the pol-
icy of a state or a non-governmental organization(2).
 The international offense is a serious viola-
tion of any right of the fundamental and protected 
rights of a state that is a member of the international 
community. Such a violation threatens the security 
and safety of people. The international offense is con-
sidered as an outrageous violation of any right of the 
human rights regardless of the type and nature of the 
violated rights. Therefore, it is necessary to prosecute 
the ones who committed international offenses and 
make sure that they are punished. Hence, the Inter-
national Criminal Court was established. The latter 
court is responsible for prosecuting, and punishing 
the ones who committed international offenses. It is 
responsible for promoting justice and equality among 
the members of the international community. It is re-
sponsible for deterring any one from committing an 
offense that may threaten the security and safety of 
people.
 The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court was adopted in 1998. The International 
criminal court was formally established in 2002. This 
led to the completion of the structure of the interna-
tional judiciary. Through the latter statute, it became 
possible to prosecute the offenders who committed 
genocides, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 
after 1 / 7 / 2002 (i.e. after the latter Statute was en-
forced).
 It was necessary to list in the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court the acts that are consid-
ered as international offenses and fall under the ju-
risdiction of the International Criminal Court. It was 
also necessary to list the punishments of the ones 
who committed such offenses.  Listing the offenses 
and their punishments is necessary to enable the lat-
ter court to prosecute the ones who committed in-
ternational offenses. That is based on the following 
principle of legality: (No one can be held liable for a 
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crime nor punished without having a legal text that 
was enacted prior to the commitment of the crime 
and prohibits the concern crime). Therefore, it was 
necessary to have a legal text that prohibits the com-
mitment of international offenses without stipulating 
a reason that may permit the commitment of such 
acts or prevent the enforcement of punishment on 
the ones who committed them.
 The exclusion of the criminal responsibility 
refers to cases in which the offender is not held liable 
for because he lacks cognition, freedom to choose or 
both at the time of committing the actus reus ele-
ment of the offense. In such cases, the offender’s free 
will shall be legally negated and he/she shall not be 
held criminally liable for his offense. Exclusion of the 
criminal responsibility does not mean that the com-
mitted offense is considered permissible. Exclusion is 
not considered as a justification for the committed 
offense. 
 In the cases of justification or permissibility, 
the mental elements of the offense shall be negated 
under the exceptions stipulated in the law prohibiting 
the act. Such exceptions shall make the act deemed 
as permissible or justified(3). Under these items, those 
acts shall be decriminalized and the doer shall be ac-
quitted. That shall apply even if the other elements of 
the international offense are present. Therefore, the 
doer shall not be held criminally liable.
The Study’s Significance
 The significance of the present study arises 
from seeking to identify the reasons of excluding the 
criminal responsibility of offenders who committed 
international offenses. This study also aimed at iden-
tifying the legal requirements that must be fulfilled 
to be implemented to set the legal effects. The re-
searchers aimed at identifying these reasons and re-
quirements in accordance with the Statute of the Per-
manent International Criminal Court. The researchers 
also aimed at conducting a comparison in this regard 
between the latter statute and the national criminal 
law.
Statement of the Problem
 In order to achieve the objectives of the 
study, the researchers begin by identifying the prob-
lem of the study and by explaining the scientific 
methodology the study adopts.  The problem of the 
study can be represented in the following questions: 
What are the reasons behind the exclusion of the 
criminal responsibility of the offenders who commit 
international offenses? In other words, does  the Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court specify such 
reasons like the national criminal law does?
The Objectives of the Study 
The present study aims at:
1. Shedding a light on the reasons behind the 
exclusion of the criminal responsibility of 
the offenders who commit an international 
offense in accordance with the Statute of 
the International Criminal Court. The study 
also aims to compare these reasons with 
the ones specified in the national criminal 
law.
2. Identifying the reasons of the exclusion of 
the criminal responsibility of the offenders 
who commit an international offense in ac-
cordance with the Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. The Study also aims 
to identify the extent of conformity of these 
reasons with the ones specified in the na-
tional criminal law.
3. Identifying the legal requirements that 
must be met to exclude the criminal re-
sponsibility of the offenders who commit an 
international offense in accordance with the 
rules adopted by the International Criminal 
Court.
4. Identifying the legal implications resulting 
from the presence of a reason that excludes 
the criminal responsibility of the offenders 
who commit an international offense in ac-
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cordance with the rules adopted by the In-
ternational Criminal Court.
Methodology
 Due to the nature of the study, the research-
ers adopt several approaches to fulfill the objectives 
of the study. These approaches are the descriptive 
analytical approach and the comparative approach. 
The researchers have reviewed the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court which was adopted 
in 1998, the Jordanian and Egyptian criminal laws, 
several international agreements, the relevant judicial 
rulings, and the relevant legal books and references. 
The above reviews help to identify the opinions of 
jurists and intellectualist who are specialized in laws.
The Parts of the Study
 The present study is divided into the follow-
ing: the background of the study, part one, part two, 
and the conclusion. Part one deals with the reasons 
behind the exclusion of the criminal responsibility of 
offenders who commit international offenses which 
are attributed to the offender’s lack of capacity. Part 
two deals with the reasons behind the exclusion of 
the criminal responsibility of offenders who commit 
international offenses which are attributed to the of-
fender’s lack of free will.
Background of the Study
 The international offense is an act that in-
volves a violation of the International Criminal Law. 
It is an illegitimate act that violates the international 
rights of a state. When all the elements of the inter-
national offense are present, one shall be held liable 
for committing the international offense and shall be 
punished for committing it. These elements are: the 
moral element (Mens rea), external element (actus 
reus), and the unlawfulness of the act under the law. 
If all the elements are present, the one who commits 
the international offense shall be held criminally li-
able and punished for committing it(4).
 To consider the mental element present, it 
is not enough to have the criminal capacity present 
only. In fact, the offender must have his free will when 
deciding to commit the offense. If the offender has 
his/her free will, it shall enable the judiciary to hold 
the offender accountable for his/her failure to com-
ply with the orders or prohibitions specified through 
legal texts. In case there are circumstances that affect 
the normal function of the offender’s will, the men-
tal element shall be negated. This applies in case the 
circumstances prevent the offender from assimilating 
the consequences of his offense. It also applies to the 
circumstances that eliminate the offender’s ability to 
decide willingly(5).
 The reasons behind the exclusion of the 
criminal responsibility of the offender who commits 
an international offense involve the reasons and cir-
cumstances that affect the offender’s will leading 
it to be legally negated. If the offender’s will fulfills 
two conditions, it shall be considered legally valid. 
These two conditions are: cognition, and freedom 
to choose. If one of those conditions is not met, the 
offender shall not be held criminally liable for his of-
fense. In case the responsibility is excluded due to the 
negation of the criminal intent, the act he/she com-
mits is still illegitimate(6).
 The Rome Statute of the International Crim-
inal Court does not limit the reasons of excluding the 
criminal responsibility to specific reasons. Therefore, 
the judge can rule in each case involving exclusion at 
his/her own discretion. In case, he/she finds that the 
offender’s will is negated, he/she must exclude the 
offender’s responsibility. The judge is also entitled to 
base the ruling on the national criminal legislations. 
He/she is also entitled to base the ruling on the domi-
nant opinions issued by jurists at their own discretion 
about criminal matters. Article 31 / paragraph 1 of the 
latter statute identifies the reasons behind the exclu-
sion of the criminal responsibility of the offender who 
commits an international offense. Paragraph No. 3 of 
the latter article states that the court is entitled to 
consider any other reason for excluding the offender’s 
criminal responsibility other than the ones specified 
in paragraph No.1. That can be done in case the rea-
son is specified in the chosen applicable law as it is 
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stated in article 21(7).
 The Statute of the International Criminal 
Court identifies the cases in which the criminal re-
sponsibility is excluded in a manner that is similar to 
the national criminal law. Such cases include the self-
defense case. The latter statute considers self-defense 
as a reason for deeming the act as permissible and 
excluding the offender’s criminal responsibility. In 
this regard, the latter statute is influenced by the ap-
proach adopted by the Anglo Saxon law. The same 
approach was adopted by the new French criminal 
law of 1992. Article 122-1 of the latter law identifies 
the reasons of permissibility and the reasons of exclu-
sion of the criminal responsibility without distinguish-
ing one from another(8). This differs from the Egyptian 
and Jordanian criminal laws that adopt the Latin law 
approach(9).
 Under the Statute of the International Crim-
inal Court, there shall be no liability nor punishment, 
unless the mental element is present. In other words, 
the offender commits the act with a criminal intent 
and knowledge. The intent is considered present if 
the offender decides to commit the actus reus (i.e. 
the conduct) willingly(10).
 Under the Rome Statute of the Internation-
al Criminal Court, there are reasons for negating the 
mental element of the crime. Negating this element 
shall lead to excluding the criminal responsibility of 
the offender who commits an international offense. 
These reasons are the following:(11)
1. Having a mental illness
2. Involuntary intoxication by alcohol 
3. Immaturity
4. Duress
5. Mistake of fact or mistake of law
6. Obedience of superior’s orders
7. Self-defense
 Through the parts listed below, the re-
searchers aim at dealing with each of the reasons 
mentioned above. These reasons can be classified 
into two categories. The first category includes the 
reasons attributed to the lack of capacity. Such rea-
sons include: having a mental illness, immaturity and 
involuntary intoxication by alcohol.The second cat-
egory includes the reasons that are attributed to the 
absence of the offender’s free will. Part one deals with 
the reasons of the first category while part two deals 
with the reasons of the second category. This is illus-
trated below:
Part One: 
 This part deals with three reasons for the 
exclusion of criminal responsibility of the offender 
who commits international offenses which can be at-
tributed to the lack of capacity. Such reasons prevent 
holding the offender accountable for his offense. This 
shall make the offender unfit for punishment enforce-
ment. These reasons are listed below:
Section One: Mental illness:
 The national legislator considers insanity 
and mental disability as reasons that affect and ne-
gate one’s capacity due to their influence on one’s 
cognition and freedom to choose.  Article No. 62 of 
the Egyptian criminal law states the following: (No 
penalty shall be imposed on one losing consciousness 
or the faculty of choice in his work at the time of com-
mitting the deed: either due to insanity or mental disa-
bility, or to unconsciousness resulting from drugs what-
ever their kind if he takes them forcibly or unknowingly).
 In the latter context, insanity and mental 
disability refer to any disease that affects the men-
tal functions leading to deprive one from awareness 
and cognition. Such mental functions involve one’s 
ability to carry out simple and complex mental pro-
cesses. Such processes involve knowledge, atten-
tion, memory, imagination, evaluation and any other 
mental process. One shall be considered as lacking 
capacity, if he/she suffers from a mental disability that 
deprives him/her from acting upon his/her free will 
with controlling his various drives. That is because the 
offender in such a case is under the influence of one 
actual drive that he/she cannot get rid of. This applies 
to the offenders who suffer from paranoia. The legisla-
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tor does not categorize the psychopathic disorders as 
mental disorders that affect one’s legal capacity.
 Under the Statute of the International Crim-
inal Court, if a person suffers from a mental disorder 
that eliminates cognition, the criminal responsibility 
shall be excluded. For example, article 31 (1) (a) of the 
latter statute states the following: 
 “A person shall not be criminally responsi-
ble if, at the time of that person's conduct:
 a) The person suffers from a mental dis-
ease or defect that destroys that person's capacity to 
appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his or her 
conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct to 
conform to the requirements of law”.
 Under the latter article, in order to exclude 
one’s criminal responsibility, one must be suffering 
from a mental disorder or defect that destroys his ca-
pacity to understand or control his/her conduct at the 
time of committing the crime.
 The same was stated explicitly through ar-
ticle No. (62) of the Egyptian criminal law.  The lat-
ter article states the following: (No punishment shall 
be enforced on the offender who lacks awareness, or 
freedom to choose at the time of committing the of-
fense due to insanity or mental defect).
 In case the offender suffers from an inter-
mittent mental disorder and is aware at the time of 
committing the offense, the offender’s criminal re-
sponsibility shall not be excluded. This applies even if 
the disorder affects the offender’s psychological state 
during the concerned period of time(12).
 The Egyptian legislator deals in general 
with the case of full insanity through using the follow-
ing expressions (insanity or mental defect). However, 
Egyptian legislator does not deal with partial insanity. 
Thus, the Egyptian legislator deals withthe criminal 
capacity either as fully present or fully absent. The lat-
ter legislator entitles the judge to rule and decide the 
punishments at his/her own discretion in accordance 
with the offender’s personal circumstances. Under 
the Egyptian criminal law, providing a proof of having 
a mental defect shall negate one’scriminal capacity. 
Thus, the offender’s criminal responsibility shall be 
excluded. However, this mental defect should be that 
deprives the offender from cognition, or freedom to 
choose at the time of committing the offense due to 
insanity or mental disorder.
 The same approach is adopted by the Jor-
danian legislator. For instance, paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
article 92 of the Jordanian criminal law states the fol-
lowing: ((1) Whoever commits an act while he / she 
is unable to realize the nature of his/her acts or is un-
able to realize that it is prohibited to commit such 
an act due to mental disorder, shall be exempt from 
punishment.(2) Whoever is exempt from punishment 
based on the previous paragraph shall be admitted to 
a mental illnesses hospital until he/she is proven to be 
cured by a medical committee report and he/she no 
longer represent danger to public safe).(13)
 One of the judgments of the Jordanian 
Court of Cassation states that the police court shall 
exclude the offender’s criminal responsibility in ac-
cordance with provisions of the law in case it received 
proofs indicating the offender was suffering from a 
mental disorder and deprived from free will at the 
time of committing the crime(14).
Section two: Involuntary intoxication by alcohol
 Article 31 (1) (b) of the Statute of the Per-
manent International Criminal Court states the one of 
the reasons for excluding the criminal responsibility 
is the involuntary intoxication by alcohol.  Under the 
latter article, the offender shall not be held criminally 
liable for his offense, if at the time of that conduct:
 “The person is in a state of intoxication that 
destroys that person's capacity to appreciate the un-
lawfulness or nature of his or her conduct, or capac-
ity to control his or her conduct to conform to the 
requirements of law, unless the person has become 
voluntarily intoxicated under such circumstances that 
the person knew, or disregarded the risk, that, as a re-
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sult of the intoxication, he or she was likely to engage 
in conduct constituting a crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court”
 Under the general rules of the criminal law, 
the effects resulting from alcohol or drugs include the 
effects influencing cognition, and freedom to choose. 
For instance, drinking alcohol shall seriously affect 
the one’s mental state leading him to lose ability to 
appreciate the implications of his conduct. Drinking 
alcohol also affects one’s free will through eliminating 
one’s ability to control his drives, or reducing the ef-
fectiveness of such a control.
 Article 62 of the Egyptian criminal law deals 
with two kinds of intoxication by alcohol. The first 
kind is represented in the voluntary intoxication by 
alcohol, whereas the second one is represented in the 
involuntary intoxication by alcohol. The latter article 
states the following: (No penalty shall be imposed on 
one losing consciousness or the faculty of choice in 
his work at the time of committing the deed: either 
due to insanity or mental disability or to unconscious-
ness resulting from drugs whatever their kind if he 
takes them forcibly or unknowingly).
 The same approach is applied by the Jorda-
nian Court of Cassation.  One of the judgments of the 
latter court states that the criminal responsibility shall 
not be excluded in case the ones pulls out the gun 
in public claiming that he is drunk. That is because 
article No. (93) of the Jordanian criminal law states 
the following:
 “Whoever loses his/her volition or reason 
when committing an act due to alcohol or drugs, re-
gardless of its nature or type, shall be exempt from 
punishment; provided that he / she consumed such 
substance against his/her will or without his / her 
knowledge”(15).
 One of the reasons of excluding the crimi-
nal responsibility include the involuntary intoxication 
by alcohol or drug that leads one to lose awareness. 
This applies to the acts committed while one is una-
ware due to such an involuntary intoxication(16).
 Involuntary intoxication by alcohol often 
occurs under coercion or without one’s knowledge. 
This applies to the drugs offered to the offenders 
through deception and hence makes the offender 
lose awareness. In such a case, the offender has a 
good intent.
 There are certain conditions that must be 
met to exclude the offender’s criminal responsibility 
in the case he/she is intoxicated by alcohol involun-
tarily. These conditions are(17):
1. The offender must be fully unaware due to 
involuntarily intoxication by alcohol and rep-
resented as lacking cognition or freedom to 
choose.
2. The act is committed when the offender is 
unaware due to involuntarily intoxication by 
alcohol.
3. The intoxication by alcohol must have oc-
curred against the offender’s will, whether he/
she has taken the alcohol purposefully or by 
a mistake.
 When deciding to hold (or not hold) the 
offender voluntarily intoxication by alcohol,the Egyp-
tian Court of Cassation requires ruling based on the 
kind of the committed purposeful offenses. For in-
stance, there are offenses that require the presence of 
the specific criminal intent. Other offenses require the 
presence of the general criminal intent only. The latter 
court decides that the intoxicated offender shall not 
be held liable for the specific criminal intent due to 
its negation. It is negated because the intoxicated of-
fender lacks awareness. However, he/sheshall be held 
liable for the general criminal intent only.
 Therefore, the intoxicated offender shall not 
be held liable for a murder. However, he/she shall be 
held liable for beating someone to death. In the latter 
offense, the intoxicated offender shall be held liable 
because the general criminal intent is present which 
is represented in the depriving someone from his/
her life. However, there are offenses that require the 
presence of both intents, rather than requiring the 
presence of the general intent. Such offenses include 
forgery. If the intoxicated offender committed such an 
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offense, he/she shall not be held liable(18).
 That is inconsistent with article 62. For in-
stance, the latter article confirms that the alcohol in-
toxication affecting capacity and excluding criminal 
responsibility is restricted only to the involuntary in-
toxication by alcohol. As for the voluntary intoxication 
by alcohol, it shall not exclude the criminal responsi-
bility nor shall be considered as affecting capacity.
 Thus, the legislator decides to hold the 
offender intoxicated voluntarily liable for all the of-
fenses he/she commits while he is drunk. In the latter 
case, that shall apply to the offenses committed pur-
posefully and the ones committed non-purposefully. 
In case the offense is committed purposefully, there 
shall be no difference between the offenses that re-
quire a specific intent and the ones that require a 
general intent since the legislator considers the of-
fender intoxicated voluntarily as a person who has a 
legal capacity like any other normal person who is not 
intoxicated by alcohol.  It should be noted that hold-
ing such an offender liable violates the general rules. 
However, this rule is based on the legislator’s decision 
that is represented through article 62 of the Egyptian 
criminal law. The latter article prevents the enforce-
ment of a punishment on the offender intoxicated 
involuntarily. That means that the latter offender shall 
not be held liable due to being involuntary intoxicat-
ed. Thus, if the offender is voluntary intoxicated, the 
rule of article 62 shall not apply. Therefore, there is no 
reason to exclude the offender's criminal responsibil-
ity(19).
Section three: Immaturity
 Most legislators are keen to specify a spe-
cific age after which one shall be held legally liable for 
his/her acts. That is because before the specified age, 
one’s cognitive functions are not considered fully de-
veloped and that shall not enable one to distinguish 
the right acts from the bad acts. In such a case, the 
offender shall be considered unfit to be held account-
able for his lack of compliance with the provisions of 
the criminal law(20). This age differs from one country 
to another due to the differences between countries 
in terms of the geographical setting, climate, and cul-
tural conditions(21).
 The Egyptian legislator has set rules that 
deal with the juvenile who commits one of the of-
fenses prohibited under the criminal law or commit-
ted any act that is considered as a threat to society. 
The latter legislator deals with that through the Egyp-
tian juvenile law No. 31 of 1974. Article 1 of the latter 
law states that the term juvenile applies to the ones 
who are under 18 years old at the time of committing 
the offense or the deviant behavior.
Differences between the juvenile’s offenses and 
deviant acts:
 The juvenile’s deviant acts refer to the be-
haviors that are committed by a juvenile and are not 
necessarily considered as crimes. However, they rep-
resent a threat to society. In this regard, the legisla-
tor did not differentiate between juveniles in terms of 
their age at the time of committing the deviance act. 
However, they must be under 18 years old to exclude 
their responsibility for the deviance act. That applies 
even if they are under 7 years old.
 The juvenile’s offenses refer to the cases in 
which the juvenile commits an offense prohibited un-
der the law and he shall be punished for. However, the 
juvenile, must be under 7 years old. In this regard, the 
legislator differentiates between the following two 
categories(22):
• The first category involves the juveniles 
who are under 15 years old. The legislator 
considers them fully deprived from their 
criminal capacity for any criminal act that 
is prohibited under the law. Thus, there 
shall be no punishment enforced on them 
for any offense they commit except for the 
confiscation punishment and closing their 
shops. If the juvenile who is under 15 years 
old commits two crimes or more, there shall 
be one legal procedure taken against him/
her. The same applies in case the authorities 
found that such a juvenile commits another 
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offense previously or commits another of-
fense after issuing the legal action against 
him/her. That is because the preventive ac-
tion shall prevent the juvenile from repeat-
ing the same offense.
• The second category involves the juveniles 
whose ages are more than 15 years old and 
less than 18 years old. The Egyptian legisla-
tor considers them as having a criminal ca-
pacity. However, in case the offense is crimi-
nal, it is mandatory to consider his/her age 
as an excuse to mitigate the punishment. 
That is decided under the national crimi-
nal law of Egypt (i.e. the Egyptian Criminal 
Law).
 As for the Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court, it states that its provisions are enforced on 
the ones who reach 18 years old and commits one of 
the offenses prohibited under article 5 of this statute. 
In other words, the latter court is not authorized to 
prosecute the ones who are under 18 years old(23).
 This means that the latter statute adopts a 
principle that is recognized by the major criminal laws 
in the world.  This principle is represented in the ille-
gality of prosecuting children by the ordinary courts 
of adults because they should be prosecuted by the 
juvenile’s court(24).
 Excluding the criminal responsibility of the 
recruited children is considered problematic. That is 
because recruiting the juveniles who are under 15 
years old is considered one of the war crimes under 
the aforementioned statute. Thus, recruiting the ju-
veniles whose ages are above 15 and approving to 
recruit them are not considered as international of-
fenses. For instance, if a state recruits combatants 
whose ages are above 15 years old and less than 18 
years old, it shall not be considered as a crime that 
falls under the latter court's jurisdiction.  However, 
during the recent period, most of the terrible crimes 
committed in armed conflicts are committed by such 
combatants(25).
 Thus, prosecuting the juvenile who does 
not reach 18 years old at the time of committing the 
international offense does not fall under the Inter-
national Criminal Court's jurisdiction.  However, how 
shall such a juvenile be prosecuted in case his offense 
is not prohibited under the national legislations of the 
state he belongs to? In such a case, his state shall not 
be able to prosecute him due to the following princi-
ple of legality: (No crime without law and no punish-
ment without law). In such a case, the juvenile shall 
keep fighting as being a state’s combatant who fights 
in obedience of the order of his leaders and superiors. 
In this way, there shall be no punishment enforced 
on him/her, especially in case the state's judiciary is 
corrupted or collapsed.  Therefore, the juvenile shall 
not be held liable for the offense even if it is an inter-
national offense(26).
 Therefore, to have coherence between ar-
ticles, the legal age specified in the statute must be 
changed to prosecute the juveniles whose ages are 
above 15 years old. In addition, the statute must en-
force punishment on the ones who recruit the juve-
niles whose ages are above 15 years old and less than 
18 years old. In addition, the enforced punishment on 
the juveniles whose ages are above 15 years old must 
be less harsh than the one enforced on adults. This 
should be done in pursuant to the juvenile laws that 
are recognized internationally(27).
Part two: 
 The reasons of the exclusion of the criminal 
responsibility of the offenders who commits interna-
tional offenses that are attributed to the lack of free 
will.The researchers shed a light on the significance 
of the free will in holding one criminally liable for an 
international offense. The present part deals with the 
reasons of excluding the criminal responsibility of the 
offenders who commit international offenses that are 
attributed to the absence of free will. These reasons 
are presented below:
Section One: Duress:
 Under national and international legisla-
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tions, if a person is subjected to any form of duress, 
the  free will shall be negated and hence be consid-
ered a reason for excluding the criminal responsibility.
 Duress refers to the act of pressuring some-
one’s will to make another perform an act that fulfills 
the will of the person exerting the pressure (28). This 
pressure involves causing fear. Duress is categorized 
into two types: physical and moral duress:
1.  If the person is subjected to a physical du-
ress, it means that this person has acted 
against his/her will since he/she has been 
compelled by force to perform a specific act 
or behavior. One shall not be held liable for 
such an act or behavior because one has 
performed it under a completion by force 
serving as a tool that fulfills the will of the 
person compelling that one (29). In such a 
case, the one who has performed the act of 
completion is considered the actor and shall 
be prosecuted(30). 
2.  If the person is subjected to a moral duress, 
it means that he has been forced by a threat 
to commit a criminal act in the aim of fulfill-
ing the will of the person compelling him/
her. In such a case, there is no compulsion 
by physical force. However, the free will 
of the actor is affected leading him/her to 
commit a criminal act(31).
 One is considered committing an offense 
under duress if one has committed it against his/her 
will and under the effect of a compulsion that causes 
fear from an imminent harm or damage(32).That is con-
sidered one of the forms of the compelling circum-
stances. Moral compulsion may be represented in a 
behavior that presses someone’s will. It may be also 
performed through employing the force of nature to 
press some one’s will(33).
 Thus, the physical duress shall fully negate 
the actor’s free will. The person compelled by physi-
cal force does not have any choice but to carry out 
the behavior requested by the compeller. As for the 
moral duress, it does not fully negate the free will of 
the compelled person since it provides the compelled 
person with a choice. Such a choice is represented in 
either to commit the criminal act requested by the 
compeller or to refrain from committing it. In other 
words, the moral duress affects the psychological 
state of the compelled person. As for the physical 
duress, it affects the compelled person physically by 
using physical force against him/her.
 After WW II, duress has become a reason for 
excluding the criminal responsibility. This applies in 
case the offender proves that he/she has committed 
the offense to avoid a serious threat that cannot be 
avoided by any other means. The concerned judiciary 
shall decide whether the circumstances are compel-
ling or not based on subjective standards rather than 
objectives ones. In other words, it depends on the 
compelled person’s state at the time of committing 
the act and the existing circumstance sat that time.
 The international criminal judiciary is en-
titled to decide whether there is a moral duress or 
not to exclude the offender’s criminal responsibility. 
In Krupp trial, the Nuremberg tribunal rejected the 
defense argument claiming that the defendant acted 
under duress. The latter tribunal decided that it is dif-
ficult to identify whether there is duress or not to ne-
gate the criminal the intent(34).
 Article No. 31 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court states the following:
 (The person shall not be criminally respon-
sible if:the conduct which is alleged to constitute a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been 
caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent 
death or of continuing or imminent serious bod-
ily harm against that person or another person, and 
the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid 
this threat, provided that the person does not intend 
to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be 
avoided. Such a threat may either be: (i) Made by oth-
er persons; or (ii) Constituted by other circumstances 
beyond that person's control).
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 Based on the aforementioned article, it can 
be concluded that the following conditions must be 
met to exclude the criminal responsibility due to the 
presence of duress:
1.  The offense must be within the jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court. It must 
be one of the offenses prohibited under ar-
ticle 5 of the latter statute. These offenses 
are: a) the crime of genocide; (b) crimes 
against humanity; (c) war crimes; and (d) 
the crime of aggression
2.  The offender’s conduct must be committed 
under duress. This duress must encompass 
a threat of imminent death or continuing or 
imminent bodily harm against that person 
or another person, and the person acts nec-
essarily and reasonably to avoid this threat.
3. The offender’s conduct is committed nec-
essarily and reasonably to avoid this threat 
that is posed on him/her or someone else.
4.  The offender did not have any intent to 
cause a greater harm than the one sought 
to be avoided. In other words, the offender 
who is under duress must have a good in-
tent.
5. The duress must be imposed by another 
person or resulting from circumstances.
 Under article 31 / 2 of the statute, the latter 
court shall determine the applicability of the grounds 
for excluding the criminal responsibility in accordance 
with the provisions of this statute to the case before 
it.
 The same was adopted by the Egyptian 
Court of Cassation. For instance, through one of its 
judgment, the latter court states that the court has 
the authority to determine whether there is a sub-
stantive coercion or not(35).
Section Two: Mistake of fact or mistake of law:
 Under the general rule of the law, a mistake 
of fact or law shall be a ground for excluding the of-
fender’s criminal responsibility only if it negates the 
mental element required. This applies only if certain 
conditions are met. 
 Sometimes, the mistake shall negate the 
criminal intent, but may be considered as an unin-
tentional wrongdoing. The mistake shall not have any 
legal value in case the conditions required for negat-
ing the mental element or the criminal intent at least 
are not met(36).
 This section deals with mistake of fact and 
mistake of law in accordance with the national and 
international laws:
* Mistake of the facts constituting part of the of-
fense:
 The mistake refers to a mental state through 
which the person fails to recognize something as it 
actually is and perceived by people. A mistake differs 
from ignorance. Ignorance refers to the lack of knowl-
edge or information about something. The ignorance 
that excludes liability is the one that leads one to 
commit an offense. Most jurists believe that mistakes 
and ignorance should be treated similarly when ex-
amining the mental elements of an offense(37).
 Committing a mistake in identifying the 
facts constituting part of the offense may be a sub-
stantial or insubstantial mistake. The substantial mis-
take refers to a mistake committed in one or more of 
the facts constituting part of the crime which shall 
lead to the negating one or more of the offense ele-
ments that are legally required(38).
 Such a substantial mistake arises due to a 
misassumption about an event which leads the of-
fender to commit an offense.  In such a case, the of-
fender’s state of mind is negated and the result of 
the offender’s act shall be considered unintentional. 
An example to that may include the one who takes 
over another person’s money assuming that it is the 
offender’s own money. Another example may include 
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the one who takes over money handed to him/her as 
a deposit because he/she assumed that it is an offer-
ing(39).
 In order to exclude the criminal responsibil-
ity due to a mistake, the facts must be misunderstood 
by the offender prior to the conduct alleged in order 
to negate the criminal intent. That is required because 
committing a mistake shall negate the element of 
knowledge constituting part of the mens rea. In such 
a case, the offender’s free will is negated.
 Negating the criminal intent due to a mis-
take shall negate the element of knowledge constitut-
ing part of the mens rea. However, that shall not fully 
exclude the offender’s criminal responsibility. That 
shall apply in case the criminal responsibility can be 
attributed to an unintentional wrongdoing. An exam-
ple to that can be represented in the offense resulting 
from negligence and forgetting to take precaution-
ary measures which the offender could have taken to 
avoid the offense. In such a case, the offender shall be 
partially liable for his/her unintentional wrongdoing.
 Based on the general rule of the criminal 
law, the mistake is not considered substantial nor 
negates the criminal intent. For instance, a person 
may shoot another person with the intention to kill 
because he/she thought that this is his/her foe and 
realize later that he/she is not his foe. In such a case, 
the offender shall be held criminally liable for inten-
tional murder. That shall apply except in case the rela-
tionship between the offender and the victim or the 
disputed issue between them constitutes one of the 
required legal elements of the crime. In such excep-
tions, the offender shall be deemed as if he/she has 
committed a substantial mistake that negates the of-
fender’s criminal intent.
 Creating misleading conditions that shall 
direct the offender to commit the offense voluntar-
ily is considered a reason for excluding the offender’s 
responsibility. Such conditions may be represented 
in providing misleading information about the cause 
leading to the offense or about the nature of the of-
fense. Such conditions may include those affecting 
the offender’s state of mind.
 Similar to the national criminal law, under 
the International Criminal Law, the offender must 
have prior knowledge of the actual facts that led 
him/her to commit the crime to consider the crimi-
nal intent negated. The Nuremberg tribunal was 
strict in applying this rule. The latter court required 
having valid knowledge about all the elements con-
stituting the crime in order to consider the criminal 
intent present. The latter court confirmed that lack of 
knowledge about facts and mistake of facts shall ne-
gate the criminal intent. When examining most of its 
judgments, it can be concluded that the latter court 
considers the potential (indirect) intent insufficient to 
hold one as intentionally liable for the effects of the 
criminal act that he did not expect.
 Due to such strictness, the Nuremberg tri-
bunal acquitted Schacht of the accusation of commit-
ting war preparation conducts. That is because there 
was no proofs confirming his ill intention towards 
peace. The latter court also acquitted Von Papendue 
to absence of a proof that confirms his criminal in-
tent. In addition, the court acquitted the NATO forces 
for attacking the Chinese embassy by a mistake. The 
criminal responsibility of the European Union was ex-
cluded. An apology was officially stated and the Chi-
nese government accepted the apology(40).
 Under the Statute of the International Crim-
inal Court, in order to exclude the criminal responsi-
bility, the mistake must negate the mental element 
required. Article 32 /1 of the latter Statute states the 
following:
(A mistake of fact shall be a ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility only if it negates the mental 
element required by the crime).
*Mistake of Law:
 Under the general rules of the international 
criminal law, ignorance of the criminal law shall not 
serve as a reason for excluding the criminal respon-
sibility because it is merely an assumption. Thus, no 
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one can prove that he has committed a mistake of 
law. If not knowing the law is considered as a reason 
to exclude criminal responsibility, enforcement of all 
the criminal legislations and punishments shall be 
prevented. This rule applies to the misinterpretation 
and ignorance of criminal rules that permit certain 
acts(41).
 Article (85) of the Jordanian criminal law 
states the following: (Ignorance of the law shall not 
be an excuse for any person who commits a crime). 
The same was mentioned in one of the judgments 
of the Jordanian court of cassation. The latter court 
states that if the offender is one of the Bedouins who 
live in the desert and ignorant about the laws, his/
her criminal responsibility shall not be excluded. That 
is because ignorance of the law that is enforced on 
Bedouin and urban population shall not serve as a 
reason for excluding the offender’s criminal responsi-
bility(42).
 A mistake of a law other than the criminal 
law does not always exclude responsibility. To be spe-
cific, it excludes responsibility when it negates one 
element or more of the required offense elements. 
This applies to the complementary criminal laws(43).
 Refusing to exclude the responsibility of 
the ones who violated that law is debated. That is 
because no one can have knowledge of all the in-
ternational legislations. In addition, it can be noticed 
that international legislations are enacted constantly 
and their complexity is increasing, which shall prevent 
people from having knowledge about the provisions 
of the International Criminal Law.
 Therefore, many jurists tend to avoid being 
strict in applying the rule of article 85. For instance, 
many jurists suggest that the criminal intent is negat-
ed when it is definitely impossible to have knowledge 
of the provisions of the law. They also suggest that 
ignorance can serve as an excuse in case ignorance 
or misunderstanding is related to a clause of a law 
other than the criminal law. They also believe that the 
criminal intent can be negated due to a mistake, in 
case there is no wrongdoing.
 In the light of the aforementioned, the fol-
lowing rule, ignorance of law does not negate the 
criminal responsibility, must be adopted by the inter-
national criminal law in a way that is more flexible 
than the national criminal law. This matter requires 
making decisions at the court’s own discretion, show-
ing more tolerance. That is because ignorance or mis-
take of law is a broad area when dealing with it(44). For 
instance, it is difficult to prove that the offender is ig-
norant of the criminal national law or misunderstands 
it. It is considered so because the law is written and 
published and any one can have access to it.
 However, it is different when it comes to the 
international criminal law. For instance, the latter law 
is a vague customary law that keeps changing con-
stantly.  It is also difficult to have access to it. In addi-
tion, most of the international offenses are carried out 
based on the superior’s orders. Therefore, having the 
criminal intent by the actor shall be questionable.
 The International Criminal Court does not 
consider the mistake of law as a reason for excluding 
the criminal responsibility in case the offense is within 
the jurisdiction of the court. However, if the mistake 
negates the mental element required by the offense, 
the court shall consider the mistake as a reason for 
excluding the criminal responsibility. For instance, ar-
ticle 32 / 2 of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court states the following:
 (A mistake of law as to whether a particular 
type of conduct is a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court shall not be a ground for excluding criminal 
responsibility. A mistake of law may, however, be a 
ground for excluding criminal responsibility if it ne-
gates the mental element required by such a crime, 
or as provided for in article33).
Section three: Obedience of superior’s orders:
 Obedience of superior’s orders is consid-
ered a reason for deeming the act permissible. For 
instance, article 63 of the Egyptian criminal law states 
the following: (No penalty shall he imposed if the 
deed occurs by a government employee, in the fol-
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lowing cases: First: If he/she perpetrates the deed in 
execution of an older issued to him/her by a chief he 
must obey, or he believes he must do it).
 Article 61 of the Jordanian criminal law 
states the following: (A person is not criminally liable 
for acts committed in one of the following instances: 
(1)While implementing the law. (2) Obeying an order 
commanded by a lawful authority, unless the action is 
manifestly unlawful)(45)
 The legislator considers obedience of supe-
rior’s orders as a reason for permissibility because it is 
assumed that the subordinate is under moral duress. 
In other words, the legislator assumes that the order 
issued by the superior represents a pressure enforced 
on the actor's free will leading to deprive him/her 
from his/her free will. In such a case, he/she shall be 
considered as deprived from his/her free will at the 
time of committing the act(46).
 This matter is discussed clearly in the na-
tional criminal laws. However, this does not apply to 
the intentional criminal law. In fact, all the interna-
tional offenses are usually implemented in obedience 
of orders issued by the government or the superior. 
In other words, they are not carried out based on the 
doer’s own decision(47).
 Can legislators consider the superior’s or-
ders as a reason for excluding the offender’s criminal 
responsibility or not? Can such orders be used as a 
defense argument or not?
 The London Conferences was held on 26, 
June 1945 and delegates from the United States, Unit-
ed Kingdom, France and Soviet Union participated in 
it.The aforementioned questions were raised in the 
latter conferences when the delegates discussed the 
things they agreed about in Moscow Conference in 
1943 about holding trials to prosecute the ones who 
committed war crimes in WW II.
 In the latter conference, the following ques-
tion was raised: (Can the superior’s orders serve as 
a reason for deeming the act permissible under the 
international criminal law?(48).
 Most of the delegates showed similar opin-
ions. For instance, most of them believe that superi-
or’s orders should not serve as a reason for excluding 
the offender’s criminal responsibility. However, they 
believe that it should be considered as an excuse for 
mitigating the punishment.
 Article (8) of the Nuremberg charter states 
the following: (The fact that the Defendant acted pur-
suant to order of his/her Government or of a superior 
shall not free him/her from responsibility, but may be 
considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribu-
nal determines that justice so requires(49).
 The Nuremberg tribunal applied this princi-
ple in Keitel’s case. At this case, Keitel held on to his 
claim that he acted as a solider in order to obey his 
superior’s orders. In this case, the court stated that 
the order given to a solider to kill or commit a terror-
ist act which violates the international criminal law 
shall not exclude the doer from criminal responsibil-
ity. However, it shall serve as an excuse for mitigating 
punishment under the Nuremberg charter.
 The International Law Commission was as-
signed to examine the wording of principles of the 
Nuremberg Charter and the judgments of the latter 
court. Some of the committee’s members believe that 
the obedience of superior’s order should serve as an 
excuse for mitigating punishment rather than serving 
as a reason for exclusion. Other committee's members 
disagreed(50).
 Some members believe that the obedience 
of superior’s orders shall not exclude the doer’s crimi-
nal responsibility, but shall serve only as an excuse for 
mitigating punishment. They based their opinion on 
the following:
1. Article 40 of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross states the following:
(The fact that the accused acted in obedience 
to the orders of a superior or in pursuance of a 
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law or regulation shall not constitute a valid de-
fense, if the prosecution can show that in view 
of the circumstances the accused had reason-
able grounds to assume that he was committing 
a breach of this Convention. In such a case the 
punishment may nevertheless be mitigated or 
remitted, if the circumstances justify)
 As for the superior giving the order, he/she 
shall be considered fully liable for the offense, 
even if he/she issued the order while he/she was 
holding his/her office.
2. Article 2 / paragraph 4 of the of the control 
board law No. 10 states that the superior’s 
order shall not serve as an excuse that ex-
cludes the criminal responsibility. The latter 
law was applied by the local English, Ameri-
can and French military courts in the areas 
occupied by Germany(51). As for the ones 
who disagreed, they based their opinions 
on the following:
1. Refusing to consider the obedience 
of superior’s orders as a reason for ex-
cluding responsibility shall violate the 
legal rules indicating that one should 
enjoy his right to choose freely. That 
is because one’s will is pressed by 
compulsion in case of obedience.
2. This violates ethical principles. That 
is because the doer does not actually 
enjoy his/her full free will to refuse 
performing the act.
 a The person was under a legal obligation to 
obey orders of the Government or the supe-
rior in question;
 b The person did not know that the order 
was unlawful. However, in case he knew that 
it is unlawful, he shall be held liable for his 
offense. That is because in such a case, the 
mens rea is present.
 c The order was not manifestly unlawful. Un-
der the latter statute, orders to commit geno-
cide or crimes against humanity are manifest-
ly unlawful.  As for the war crime, the court 
shall decide whether it is manifestly unlawful 
or not at its own discretion)(55).
 Thus, the soldiers who committed geno-
cides at Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Rwan-
dain obedience of their superior’s orders cannot claim 
for exclusion of their criminal responsibility arguing 
that the unlawfulness is not manifested because 
these crimes are manifestly unlawful (56).
 In addition, a soldier may rape and kill a 
young girl or old women and deform her dead body 
in obedience of his superior’s orders. In such a case, 
he cannot appeal for exclusion from criminal respon-
sibility arguing that the unlawfulness is not mani-
fested because his offense is manifestly unlawful and 
considered as an international offense(57). 
Section Four: Self-defense:
 Self-defense(58) is a right given for every one 
under the law in order to protect human's survival. 
It is required to recognize this right under the law to 
protect people’s rights including their right to life. 
One is entitled to use his right in self-defense only to 
protect one’s self from a violent crime that requires 
using the necessary means to protect one’s self (59).
 Under the general rules of the criminal 
law(60), self-defense is considered as a reason for 
deeming the act permissible. A self-defense act also 
negates the illegitimate nature of such an act.  In the 
case of self-defense, the damage caused to the one 
initiating the attack is considered legitimate and does 
not violate the provisions of the criminal law that seek 
protecting people. In the self-defense case, these pro-
visions shall not be in effect because the defender 
has priority over the attacker to protect his/her rights. 
Thus, the law authorized the defender to strike back 
at the attacker through using the necessary means 
that shall cause harm to the attacker. In other words, 
the self-defense act is considered permissible be-
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cause it is carried out to avoid a social harm.
 The Egyptian legislator set rules that govern 
the use of self-defense right through article 246 that 
states the following: (The right of lawful self-defense 
allows a person, in other than the exceptional cases 
defined hereinafter, to use the power necessary to 
obviate any act considered as a crime on one's life 
prescribed as prescribed in this law. The lawful right 
of defending one's property and funds allows using 
the power necessary to fend off any act considered as 
a crime of those prescribed in parts (2), (8), (13), and 
(14) of this book and in clause 4 of Article 279).
 The Jordanian legislator considers the self-
defense act a legal right. For instance, article 60/1 of 
the Jordanian criminal law states the following: (Exe-
cution of one's right is considered as any act deemed 
necessary due to an imminent need to prevent an il-
legal and unprovoked offence against his / her person 
or property or the property or person of others)(61).
Based on those two articles, the law required meeting 
the following conditions to legitimize the self-defense 
act: (i.e. regarding the defense and attack acts):
1. Regarding the attack act, it must encom-
passes a present imminent threat of using 
force in an unlawful manner. In other words, 
this act must involve a threat of violating 
any of the rights protected by the law, pro-
vided that it is imminent. Therefore, the de-
fense act is deemed as unlawful in case it 
was carried out against someone exercising 
his/her right or carrying out his duty. To be 
specific, the defense act is lawful in case it 
was carried out against someone misusing 
his/her right of self-defense or crossed the 
limits in using it.
2. Regarding the defense act, it must be nec-
essary. This means that there is no way to 
obviate the act considered as a threat ex-
cept by striking back through using force. In 
case there is another way to obviate the act 
considered a threat, the defense act shall 
not be deemed a lawful self-defense act.
 The defense act must be proportionate to 
the threat posed by the attacker. Thus, the defender 
shall be held liable for his/her defense acts that ex-
ceed what is considered proportionate(62).
 Similar to the national law, the international 
law recognizes the self-defense right(63). The interna-
tional law granted the members of the international 
community the self-defense right to be used when 
necessary. Such a right is represented in using force 
to fend off an armed aggression, provided that it 
is necessary to use force in such a case. It must be 
proportionate to the threat being posed. The use of 
force for defense in such a case must cease when the 
UN Security Council takes the required procedures to 
maintain security and peace in the international com-
munity(64). 
 Article 51 of the UN charter has set condi-
tions for carrying out the self-defense acts that are 
represented in the following(65):
First:The conditions that must be met in the attack 
act:
 a The unlawful armed aggression must have 
occurred already. The UN Security Council dealt 
with the definition of armed aggression in de-
tails. For instance, it states that such an aggres-
sion includes the preventive measures taken 
against a state which encompasses the use of 
force. The Security Council applied that through 
approving the report submitted by the Atomic 
Energy Commission. A criminal intent must be 
present in the unlawful armed attack. Act of ag-
gression may include the actual use of armed 
force against a state or training armed gangs 
in the aim of stirring up sedition. It also applies 
to the act of overthrowing the government and 
carrying out crimes against humanity on any of 
the groups of a state and etc. All these acts are 
considered acts of aggression that entitle the at-
tacked state to carry out the defense act(66).
 b The act of aggression must be direct and 
have actually occurred, rather than being immi-
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nent. To be specific, the attack must have been 
already launched by the attacking forces against 
the attacked state or part of the attacked state in 
a direct manner(67).    
 The latter condition was set. However, some 
jurists permit the defense act even if the aggres-
sion act did not actually occur. They base their 
opinion on the lawful preventive self-defense 
rule. This rule entitles states to use armed force 
against its enemy state and demilitarize it as a 
preventive procedure. This applies even if the 
threat has not occurred yet. For instance, the 
United States claimed that its attacks on Af-
ghanistan and Iraq is based on the latter rule (i.e. 
lawful preventive self-defense rule).  
 Adopting the lawful preventive self-defense 
rule shall lead to spreading chaos in the inter-
national community and increasing international 
conflicts. It shall represent a threat to the inter-
national peace and security. That is because each 
state shall entitle itself to initiate an attack with 
claiming that it is a preventive self-defense act. It 
shall entitle each state to decide the military pro-
cedure that is considered proportionate to the 
threat that shall be faced in the future(68).
 c Under article 51 of the UN charter, the 
armed aggression must be launched against a 
member of the United Nations member states to 
have the right to strike back. However, there is a 
dispute among jurists about the fact whether the 
non-member state should enjoy this right or not. 
For instance, some jurists believe the non-mem-
ber states must not enjoy this right due to the 
existence of a legal text that restrict this right to 
the UN member states only. Other jurists believe 
that this right must be granted to non-member 
states in pursuant to the International Law(69). 
The researchers of the present study believe 
that the self-defense right is a legal right that all 
member and non-member states must enjoy to 
protect their sovereignty. The researchers also 
believe that this right cannot be restricted to cer-
tain states while excluding others.
 d The aggression must encompass a breach 
of any right of the state’s substantive rights. The 
United Nations General Assembly issued a de-
cision on 14/12/1974. Through this decision, it 
states that such rights include the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence 
rights(70).
Second: The conditions that must be met in the 
defense acts:
*The necessity condition: The defense act must be 
necessary to fend off the aggression. This requires the 
following:
1. The defense act must be the only method 
for fending off the aggression act. In case 
there was another method to fend off the 
aggression without using force and the 
state did not use it, the defense act shall 
not be considered legitimate. This shall en-
title the country initiating the aggression to 
exercise its self-defense right(71).
2.  The defense act must be launched against 
the source of aggression (i.e. against the 
state initiating the aggression act). Thus, the 
defense cannot be launched against any of 
the allied states of the latter state nor the 
neutral states since violating the rights of 
the neutral states is considered as an unjus-
tifiable international offense(72). For instance, 
the treaty of 1839 confirmed that Belgium is 
a neutral territory. However, France violated 
Belgium’s neutrality. In addition, the treaty 
of 1867 confirmed that Luxembourg is a 
neutral territory. However, Luxembourg’s 
neutrality was violated. These acts are un-
justifiable and are not considered as legiti-
mate self-defense acts(73).
3. The state that launched the defense act 
must cease when the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain inter-
national peace and security
 *The proportionality condition: The de-
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fense act must be proportionate to the threat being 
posed. In case the state exaggerated in exercising its 
self-defense right, its acts shall be considered as an 
act of aggression.
 The proportionality requirements men-
tioned in the international law do not differ much 
from the ones mentioned in the national law. Under 
both laws, the defense act must involve the same de-
gree of force that was used in the act of aggression(74).
 There is a debate over the degree of force 
that should be used to fend off the aggression act. 
In case it was proved that the attacked state used a 
degree of force that is equivalent to the force used in 
the aggression or used a lower degree of force, the 
proportionality condition shall be met. Otherwise, the 
proportionality condition is not met. In other words, 
meeting this condition requires achieving equiva-
lence between the force used in the defense act and 
the force used in the aggression act. For instance, if 
a limited war is initiated against a state, the attacked 
state is not entitled to initiate a total war.
 An aggression may be launched through 
using conventional weapons. In such a case, there is a 
debate over whether the attacked state has the right 
to fend off the attack through using nuclear weapons 
or not. In this case, most jurists do not believe that 
the attacked state has the right to use nuclear weap-
ons(75).
 One of the legitimate types of self-defense 
is called collective self-defense. For instance, if there 
is a regional agreement or alienation, the allied states 
are entitled to help each other to fend off an armed 
aggression act. The collective self-defense shall be 
considered legitimate only if there is an international 
agreement issued by a regional alienation and give 
the allied states the right to defend each other from 
any act if aggression(76). However, this agreement 
must be signed prior to the occurrence of the armed 
aggression act. Examples of this may include the 
League of Arab States, North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, Warsaw Pact, and Western European Union(77).
 Based on the aforementioned, it is conclud-
ed that a state has the right to defend itself separately 
or jointly with its allies. A state is entitled to do that 
to protect its rights or the rights of its allies.  However, 
the question arising here is the following: (Do indi-
viduals have the right to defend themselves?).
 To answer this questions, it should be noted 
that the international legal personality of the individ-
ual has been recognized. It has been recognized in 
response to the international official and non-official 
efforts that have been exerted. It has been also rec-
ognized in response to the developments that the in-
ternational community has witnessed, especially after 
the Nuremberg trials were held. Due to such develop-
ments and efforts, an individual is given international 
rights and is  held liable on the international level. In 
other words, an individual has become treated in a 
way that is similar to the way of treating countries.
 Recognizing the international legal person-
ality of an individual requires recognizing the indi-
vidual’s self-defense right on the international level. 
Based on the principle of the individual criminal re-
sponsibility, individuals are held liable for their non-
compliance with the rules of the international law. 
Under this principle, individuals must also obey the 
orders specified in the latter law. They are also held 
liable for committing any of the acts prohibited un-
der the latter law. Therefore, the rules of permissibility 
stipulated in the latter law are also enforced on them. 
That is because the rules of prohibition cannot be en-
forced unless the rules of permissibility are enforced 
too. Due to granting individuals such rights under the 
International Law, they must be granted the right to 
defend themselves against international offenses.
 The International Law is considered as a 
part of the state’s law. Therefore, individuals have the 
right to use their self-defense right against all the of-
fenses that pose a threat on them. Individuals are also 
held liable for violating any rule of the International 
Law(78).
 The International Law entitles individuals 
to exercise their self-defense right during peace and 
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war. It grants them this right to protect themselves 
and their money and honor from inhumane act. For 
instance, it is difficult to resort to the concerned au-
thorities during war. Therefore, individuals have the 
right to obviate any offense or any act considered 
a threat through using means that don’t violate the 
rules of the international law rules. However, the at-
tacked individuals should not cross the limits in using 
this right.
 The legitimate self-defense act refers to the 
act of obviating any aggression or attack that may 
be imminent or occurring at the time. The legitimate 
self-defense act is taken by the defender only against 
an attacker. This applies whether the attacker is an 
individual or a state. In this context, obviating the ag-
gression or attack must be carried out against armies 
rather than civilians. It should be noted that obviat-
ing the aggression or the attack through committing 
international offenses against innocent civilians shall 
not be considered as legitimate acts of self-defense.
 Therefore, no country is entitled to strike 
cities full of innocent civilians or exterminate them 
with claiming that it is an act of self-defense (79). In 
other words, striking places of civilians does not fall 
under legitimate act of self-defense. The same applies 
to killing, torturing, and exterminating innocent civil-
ians. This applies even if such acts are committed to 
avenge. To be more specific, all these acts are prohib-
ited.
 The same is adopted by article (31) of 
the Statute of the Permanent International Criminal 
Court. This article states the following: (In addition 
to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibil-
ity provided for in this Statute, a person shall not be 
criminally responsible if, at the time of that person's 
conduct:….c). The person acts reasonably to defend 
himself or herself or another person or, in the case of 
war crimes, property which is essential for the survival 
of the person or another person or property which is 
essential for accomplishing a military mission, against 
an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner 
proportionate to the degree of danger to the person 
or the other person or property protected. The fact 
that the person was involved in a defensive opera-
tion conducted by forces shall not in itself constitute 
a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under 
this subparagraph)(80).
Conclusion
 After shedding a light on the problem of 
the present study, the researchers concluded several 
results and suggested several recommendations. As 
for the results, they are presented below:
Results
1. The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court does not limit the reasons of 
excluding the criminal responsibility to spe-
cific reasons. Therefore, the judge can rule 
in each case involving exclusion at his own 
discretion. In case, he found that the offend-
er’s will is negated, he must exclude the of-
fender’s responsibility. He is also entitled to 
base his ruling on the dominant opinions is-
sued by jurists at their own discretion about 
criminal matters.
2.  It is necessary to have an effective and per-
manent international system that protects 
people from any serious violation of their 
rights and freedoms during peace and war.  
Such a system is considered as a guarantee 
to ensure the protection of people’s rights 
and freedoms because such a system shall 
ensure that punishments are enforced on 
the ones who violate people’s rights and 
freedoms. However, the role of the national 
criminal laws and legislation in protecting 
people’s rights and freedoms should not be 
underestimated.
3. Excluding the criminal responsibility of the 
recruited children is considered problem-
atic. That is because recruiting the juveniles 
who are under 15 years old is considered 
one of the war crimes under the aforemen-
tioned statute. Thus, recruiting the juveniles 
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whose ages are above 15 and approving to 
recruit them are not considered as interna-
tional offenses. For instance, if a state re-
cruits combatants whose ages are above 15 
years old and less than 18 years old, it shall 
not be considered as a crime that falls un-
der the latter court's jurisdiction.  However, 
during the recent period, most of the terri-
ble crimes committed in armed conflicts are 
committed by such combatants.
4.  The International Criminal Court does not 
exclude criminal responsibility due to a mis-
take of law as this shall apply in case the 
conduct is a crime that falls under the juris-
diction of the latter court. However, the mis-
take of law can be aground for excluding 
criminal responsibility, in case it negates the 
mental element required by the concerned 
crime.
5.  The Permanent International Criminal Court 
does not exclude criminal responsibility in 
case the offender commits his/her act in 
obedience of the order of his/her govern-
ment or of a superior. This applies to civil-
ians and military offenders. However, there 
are exceptions for this rule that are stated in 
article 33 of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. The latter article states the 
following.
(The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court has been committed by a person pur-
suant to an order of a Government or of a supe-
rior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve 
that person of criminal responsibility unless:
 Under the latter statute, orders to commit 
genocide or crimes against humanity are mani-
festly unlawful.  As for the war crime, the court 
shall decide whether it is manifestly unlawful or 
not at its own discretion. 
 Thus, the soldiers who committed geno-
cides in obedience of their superior’s orders 
cannot claim for exclusion of their criminal re-
sponsibility arguing that the unlawfulness is not 
manifested. That is because these crimes are 
manifestly unlawful.
6. Obviating the threat of a continuing or seri-
ous harm is a right granted for all countries 
that apply whether they are member-states 
in the United Nations or not. It should be 
noted that no country is entitled to strike 
cities full of innocent civilians or extermi-
nate them with claiming that it is a self-
defense act. In other words, striking places 
of civilians does not fall under legitimate 
self-defense acts. The same applies to kill-
ing, torturing, and exterminating innocent 
civilians. This applies even if such acts are 
committed to avenge. To be more specific, 
all these acts are prohibited.
7.  Adopting the lawful preventive self-defense 
rule shall lead to spreading chaos in the 
international community and to increas-
ing international conflicts. It shall threaten 
the international peace and security since 
adopting such a rule shall entitle states to 
use force even if the aggression has not ac-
tually occurred yet. It shall entitle the state 
to decide by itself the military procedure 
that is considered proportionate to the fu-
ture threat being faced
8.  The international community has witnessed 
several developments in the field of interna-
tional law. Due to such development, indi-
viduals have been granted an international 
legal personality. Thus, countries are not the 
only ones today who have an international 
a. The person is  under a legal obligation to 
obey orders of the Government or the supe-
rior in question;
b. The person does not know that the order 
was unlawful.
c. The order is not manifestly unlawful.
45
legal personality. Therefore, the Internation-
al Law started to protect people rather than 
protecting countries only. The same applies 
to the International Criminal Law. There are 
several manifestations of the recognition 
individual’s international legal personality. 
Such manifestations include holding one li-
able for the offenses and violations he may 
commit. The individual’s responsibility for 
an international offense shall not be exclud-
ed due to his/her legal immunity as being a 
president, or a prime minister. This applies 
despite the fact that such an immunity shall 
not hold one liable under the national law. 
Such manifestations also include granting 
one the self-defense right during peace and 
war. He/she is granted this right to protect 
himself/herself, and his money and honor 
from any inhumane act.
9. The international law entitles individuals 
to exercise their self-defense right during 
peace and war. It grants them this right to 
protect themselves, and their money and 
honor from inhumane act. For instance, it is 
difficult to resort to the concerned authori-
ties during war. Therefore, individuals have 
the right to obviate any offense or any act 
considered a threat in a way that does not 
violate the rules of the international law. 
However, the attacked individuals should 
not cross the limits in using this right.
Recommendations
 The researchers of the present study recom-
mend the following
1. Making adjustments to the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court. Such adjust-
ments should involve the reasons for exclud-
ing the criminal responsibility. Through such 
adjustments, the legislator should limit such 
reasons to specific reasons that are identified 
clearly and comprehensively with separating 
them from the reasons of permissibility.
2. To have coherence between articles, the 
legal age specified in the statute must be 
changed to prosecute the juveniles whose 
ages are above 15 years old. In addition, the 
statute must enforce punishment on the 
ones who recruit the juveniles whose ages 
are above 15 years old and less than 18 years 
old. In addition, the enforced punishment on 
the juveniles whose ages are above 15 years 
old must be less harsh than the one enforced 
on adults. That should be done in pursuant 
to the juvenile laws that are recognized inter-
nationally.
3. Article 33 / paragraph 2 must be changed. 
That is because all the offenses that are within 
the jurisdiction of the Courtand committed in 
obedience of superior must be considered as 
manifestly unlawful under the Katter statute. 
Adopting that shall ensure that all offenders 
are punished for their offenses because they 
won’t claim that the lawfulness of their acts 
are not manifested.
4. The following rule: (ignorance of law does 
not negate the criminal responsibility) must 
be adopted by the international criminal law 
in a way that is more flexible than the nation-
al criminal law. This matter requires making 
decisions at the court’s own discretion with 
showing more tolerance. That is because 
ignorance or mistake of law is a broad area 
when dealing with it. For instance, it is diffi-
cult to prove that the offender is ignorant of 
the criminal national law or misunderstood it. 
It is considered so because the law is written 
and published and any one can have access 
to it.
 However, it is different when it comes to the 
international criminal law. For instance, the latter law 
is a vague customary law that keeps changing con-
stantly.  It is also difficult to access. In addition, most 
of the international offenses are carried out based on 
the superior’s orders. Therefore, having the criminal 
intent by the actor shall be questionable.
46
References
1. Abed Al-Khaliq, Mohammad Abed Al-
Men’em. 1989. International crimes, Al-Nah-
da Al-Arabeya publishing and distribution 
house, Cairo.
2. Abed Al-Rahman, Isma’il. 2000. The protec-
tion of civilians under the criminal laws in 
the light of the spread of armed conflicts: 
An analytical and etymological study, A 
doctoral dissertation, Faculty of law, Man-
soura University, Egypt.
3. Al-Far, Abed Al-Wahed. 1996. International 
offense and the jurisdiction, Al-Nahda Al-
Arabeya Publishing and distribution house. 
Cairo.
4. Al-Halabi, Mohammad Ali Al-Salim and 
Ayad. 1997. Elaboration for the criminal law. 
The general part. 1st edition. Dar Al Thaqafa  
Publishing and Distribution.
5. Al-Refa’i,  Ahmad Abed Al-Hamid. 2004. The 
general rule of the international criminal li-
ability, Doctoral dissertation. Cairo Univer-
sity, Egypt.
6. Al-Sa’di, Hameed. 1971.  Introduction to in-
ternational criminal law with reviewing and 
analyzing the judgments of the Nuremberg 
tribunal that were held for prosecuting 
major war criminals: A comparative study 
between international offenses and their 
counterpart listed in the national law, 1st 
edition, Al-Ma’aref publishing and distribu-
tion house. Baghdad.
7. Al-Shikha, Husam Abed Al-Khaleq. 2001.  
Accountability and punishment for war 
crimes, Doctoral dissertation. Faculty of law, 
Cairo University, Egypt.
8. Ateya, Abu Al-Khair Ahmad. 1999. The per-
manent international criminal court, Al-
Nahda Al-Arabeya publishing and distribu-
tion house. Cairo.
9. Awad, Mohammd Muhyi Al-Deen. 1965. 
Studies in the criminal international law. 
The Journal of Law and Economy. Vol. 35. 
Issue No. 1. 
10. Bakeh, Sawsan Tamer Khan. 2004. Crimes 
against humanity. Doctoral dissertation. 
Faculty of Law, Cairo University, Egypt.
11. Basyoni, Mahmoud Sharif. 2004. The inter-
national criminal court, The Higher Institute 
for Human Rights at DePaul University, Al-
Shorouq Publishing and distribution house.
12. Glasser, Stefan. 1957.  Infraction Internation-
al, librariegénérale De Droit et De Jurispru-
dence, Paris.
13. Hamoudeh, Muntaser Saeed. 2006.  The In-
ternational Criminal Court, the general rule 
of international crime and the provisions of 
the International Criminal Law, Al-Jame’a Al-
Jadida Publishing and distribution house, 
Alexandria.
14. Hejazi, Abed Al-Fatah Bayomi. 2007. The In-
ternational Criminal Court: A study about 
the International Criminal Law: The General 
rule of the international criminal offense. 
The theory of the court’s jurisdiction. Al-
Kotob Al-Qanuneya Publishing and distribu-
tion house, Egypt.
15. Helmi, Nabil Ahmad (n.d). International ter-
rorism under the rules of the public interna-
tional law. Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya Publishing 
and distribution house. Cairo. 
16. Husny, Mahmoud Najeeb. 1977.  Elabora-
tion for the criminal law – The general part. 
4th  edition. Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya Publish-
ing and Distribution House, Cairo.
17. -----------. 1962. Reasons of permissibility in 
the Arab legislations: The general rule of 
permissibility – Using rights. League of Arab 
States. The Institute of Arab Graduate Stud-
ies. Cairo.
18. I’baid, Hasanain Ibrahim. 1999. The interna-
tional offense: An analytical empirical study. 
Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya Publishing and distri-
bution house, Cairo.
19. Jaradeh, Abed Al-Qader Saber. 2005. The in-
ternational criminal judiciary, Al-Nahda Al-
Arabeya publishing and distribution house, 
Cairo.
20. Kamali, Mohammad. 2006. The Individual 
criminal liability under the rules of the 
contemporary international criminal law, 
47
MA thesis, Faculty of Law, Cairo University, 
Egypt.
21. Khalaf, Mohammad Mahmoud. 1973. The 
self-defense right under the International 
Criminal law. Doctoral Dissertation. Faculty 
of Law. Cairo University, Egypt.
22. Mahmoud, Dari Khalil. And Yousif  Basel. 
2008. The International Criminal Court: Is it 
about the dominance of the law or the law 
of dominance, Al-Ma’aref  publishing and 
distribution house, Alexandria.
23. Mustafa, Mahmoud Mahmoud. 1983. Elabo-
ration of the criminal law - The general part, 
10th  edition. Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya publish-
ing and distribution house. Cairo.
24. Ramadan, Omar Al-Saeed. 1990 – 1991.  
Elaboration for the criminal law-The general 
part. Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya Publishing and 
distribution house, Cairo. 
25. Rassat, Michéle. 1987.  Droit Pénal, Presses 
Universities De France.
26. Salameh, Ma’moun. 1990. The criminal law 
– The general part, 3rd edition, Al-Feker Al-
Arabi Publishing and distribution house.
27. Seraj, Abed Al-Fatah Mohammad. 2001.The 
principle of complementarily in the inter-
national criminal judiciary, 1st  edition, Al-
Nahda Al-Arabeya publishing and distribu-
tion house, Cairo.
28. Shams Al-Deen, Ashraf Tawfiq. 1999.  The 
principles of the international criminal law, 
Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya Publishing and distri-
bution house, Cairo.
29. Stefani, Gaston. Levasseur, Georges.  Bouloc, 
Bernard. 2000.  Droit penal Général, Edition 
Dalloz, Paris,.
30. Sudqi, Abed Al-Raheem. 1986. The criminal 
international law, Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya Pub-
lishing and distribution house, Cairo.
31. Surour, Ahmad Fathi. 1996. The intermedi-
ate in the criminal law – The general part. 
Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya publishing and distri-
bution house, Cairo.
32. Tawfiq, Abed Al-Rahman. 1975.  Intoxication 
with alcohol and its impact on criminal li-
ability, Doctoral dissertation. Cairo Univer-
sity, Egypt.
33. Wafi, Ali Abed Al-Wahed. 1987.  Account-
ability and punishment. 5th edition. Al-
Nahdet Maser Publishing and distribution 
house, Cairo.
34. Yaacov, Nomi Ba. Command Responsibil-
ity, Crimes Of War Project retrieved on 
28/5/2005, By Site:www.crimesofwar.org/
thebook/command-respon.htm.
35. Al-Lemsawi , Ashraf. 2007. The Internation-
al Criminal Court, 1st edition. The National 
Center for Legal Publications, Cairo.
Endnotes
1. I’baid, Hasanain Ibrahim. 1999. The interna-
tional offense: An analytical empirical study. 
Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya Publishing and distri-
bution house, Cairo. p.5.
2. Hejazi, Abed Al-Fatah Bayomi. 2007. The In-
ternational Criminal Court: A study about 
the International Criminal Law: The General 
rule of the international criminal offense. 
The theory of the court’s jurisdiction. Al-
Kotob Al-Qanuneya Publishing and distribu-
tion house, Egypt, p.18.
3. Husny, Mahmoud Najib. 1962. Reasons of 
permissibility in the Arab legislations: The 
general rule of permissibility – Using rights. 
League of Arab States. The Institute of Arab 
Graduate Studies. Cairo. p.15.
4. I’baid, Hasanain Ibrahim. 1999. The interna-
tional offense: An analytical empirical study. 
Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya Publishing and distri-
bution house, Cairo, p.5
5. Salameh, Ma’moun. 1990. The criminal law 
– The general part, 3rd edition, Al-Feker Al-
Arabi Publishing and distribution house, 
p.363. and Ramadan, Omar Al-Saeed. 1990 
– 1991.  Elaboration for the criminal law, The 
general part. Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya Publish-
ing and distribution house, Cairo,  p.288. 
and Wafi, Ali Abed Al-Wahed. 1987.  Ac-
countability and punishment. 5th edition. Al-
Nahdet Maser Publishing and distribution 
house, Cairo, p.8.
48
6. Al-Shikha, Husam Abed Al-Khaleq. 2001.  
Accountability and punishment for war 
crimes, Doctoral dissertation. Faculty of law, 
Cairo University, Egypt, p.98
7. Husny, Mahmoud Najeeb. 1960.  Lessons 
about the International Criminal Law,  Al-
Nahda Al-Arabeya Publishing and distribu-
tion house, Cairo, p.138.
8. Rassat, Michéle. 1987.  Droit Pénal, Presses 
Universities De France, P.412.
9. Mahmoud, Dari Khalil. and Yousif  Basel. 
2008. The International Criminal Court: Is it 
about the dominance of the law or the law 
of dominance, Al-Ma’aref  publishing and 
distribution house, Alexandria. p.213.
10. Article No. 31 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. Kamali, Mohammad. 
2006. The Individual criminal liability under 
the rules of the contemporary international 
criminal law, MA thesis, Faculty of Law, Cairo 
University, Egypt, p.113.
11. Hamoudeh, Muntaser Saeed. 2006.  The In-
ternational Criminal Court, the general rule 
of international crime and the provisions of 
the International Criminal Law, Al-Jame’a Al-
Jadida Publishing and distribution house, 
Alexandria, p.212. and Al-Lemsawi , Ashraf. 
2007. The International Criminal Court, 1st 
edition. The National Center for Legal Publi-
cations, Cairo,p.40.
12. Salameh, Ma’moun. ibid. p.312. and Hejazi, 
Abed Al-Fatah Bayomi. The International 
Criminal Court. ibid. p. 362. and Ramadan, 
Omar Al-Saeed. ibid. p.289.
13. Al-Halabi, Mohammad Ali Al-Salim and 
Ayad. 1997. Elaboration for the criminal law. 
The general part. 1st edition. Dar Al Thaqafa  
Publishing and Distribution, p.407.
14. The Jordanian Court of Cassation / criminal 
division. Judgment No. 71 / 64. The legal 
principles of the Jordanian Court of Cassa-
tion of 1972. p. 220.
15. The Jordanian Court of Cassation / Criminal 
Division. Judgment No. 73 / 1 of 1973, Jour-
nal of the Jordanian Bar Association, p. 244. 
And Al-Halabi, Mohammad Ali Al-Salim and 
Ayad. ibid. p. 416
16. Salameh, Ma’moun. ibid, p.316. and Tawfiq, 
Abed Al-Rahman. 1975.  Intoxication with 
alcohol and its impact on criminal liabil-
ity, Doctoral dissertation. Cairo University, 
Egypt,  p.50
17. Salameh, Ma’moun. ibid. p.317.  and Husny, 
Mahmoud Najeeb. 1977.  Elaboration for the 
criminal law – The general part. 4th edition. 
Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya Publishing and Distri-
bution House, Cairo. p.653.
18. The Court of Cassation. 14 March, 1982, 
S.33. No.71, A group of Judgments issued 
by the Court of Cassation. p.356
19. Husny, Mahmoud Najeeb. Elaboration for 
the criminal law – The general part, ibid. 
p.552
20. Hejazi, Abed Al-Fatah Bayomi. ibid, p.294 – 
295. 
21. Husny, Mahmoud Najeeb. Elaboration for 
the criminal law – The general part, Ibid, 
p.547
22. Ma’moun Salameh. ibid. p.303 – 305. And 
Mustafa, Mahmoud Mahmoud. 1983. Elabo-
ration of the criminal law - The general part, 
10th edition. Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya publish-
ing and distribution house. Cairo, p.532 - 
533
23. Article No. 26 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court.  Al-Lemsawi, Ashraf. 
ibid, p.39.
24. Ateya, Abu Al-Khair Ahmad. 1999. The per-
manent international criminal court, Al-
Nahda Al-Arabeya publishing and distribu-
tion house. Cairo, p.41-42.
25. Bakeh, Sawsan Tamer Khan. 2004. Crimes 
against humanity. Doctoral dissertation. 
Faculty of Law, Cairo University, Egypt,  p.98
26. Seraj, Abed Al-Fatah Mohammad. 2001.The 
principle of complementarily in the interna-
tional criminal judiciary, 1st edition, Al-Nah-
da Al-Arabeya publishing and distribution 
house, Cairo, p.108. 
27. Jaradeh, Abed Al-Qader Saber. 2005. The in-
ternational criminal judiciary, Al-Nahda Al-
Arabeya publishing and distribution house, 
49
Cairo, p. 521.
28. Article No. 88 of the Jordanian criminal law 
states that threats are considered as a form 
of duress and shall make one considered 
as lacking free will and freedom of choice. 
That is considered as a reason for excluding 
punishment. The same was adopted by the 
Jordanian Court of Cassation / criminal divi-
sion / Judgment No. 78 / 2 of 1988 p.444. Al-
Halab, Mohammad Ali Al-Salim Ayadi. ibid, 
p.393 - 394.
29. Awad, Mohammd Muhyi Al-Deen. 1965. 
Studies in the criminal international law. The 
Journal of Law and Economy. Vol. 35. Issue 
No. 1. p.916.
30. Abed Al-Khaliq, Mohammad Abed Al-
Men’em. 1989. International crimes, Al-Nah-
da Al-Arabeya publishing and distribution 
house, Cairo, p.312 – 313.  
Rassat, Mechéle. Droit Pénal, Op.Cit, P.458.
31. Husny, Mahmoud Najeeb. Elaboration for 
the criminal law, ibid, p.312 - 313.
32. Surour, Ahmad Fathi. 1996. The intermedi-
ate in the criminal law – The general part. 
Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya publishing and distri-
bution house, Cairo, p.520. and Stefani, Gas-
ton. Levasseur, Georges.  Bouloc, Bernard.  
Droit penal Général, Edition Dalloz, Paris, 
2000, P.333.
33. Salameh, Ma’moun. Ibid,  p.365.
34. I’baid, Hasanain. Ibid, p.125. and Al-Masdi, 
Adel Abdullah. 2003. The International 
Criminal Court. 1st edition. Al-Nahda Al-
Arabeya publishing and distribution house. 
Cairo. P.200. and Abed Al-Khaliq, Moham-
mad Abed Al-Men’em. International crimes. 
ibid. p.316.
35. A judgment of the Egyptian Court of Cassa-
tion / The criminal department/ Appeal No. 
2314 / Judicial Year: 54 Q. Session held on 
6/1/1985. S. 36 p.52.
36. Salameh, Ma’moun. Ibid, p.372. and Rama-
dan, Omar Al-Saeed. Ibid, p.315.
37. Salameh, Ma’moun. Ibid, p. 273. and Rama-
dan, Omar Al-Saeed. Ibid, p. 315.
38. Husny,  Mahmoud Najeeb. Elaboration for 
the criminal law – The general part, ibid, 
p.614.
39. Under the Charter of the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal, holding the one who join a criminal 
group of organization liable depends on 
his knowledge of the objectives of such a 
group/organization and the nature of its 
activity. If he proved his ignorance or mis-
assumption of it, his criminal responsibility 
shall be excluded. The Nuremberg Tribunal 
applied this rule to all the offenses that fall 
under its jurisdiction. Husny, Mahmoud Na-
jeeb. Lessons about the International Crimi-
nal Law, ibid, p. 153.
 This was adopted by article 86 of the 
Jordanian criminal law, which states the 
following: (Any perpetrator or inciter or 
accomplice who commits any of the acts 
which constitute an intentional crime while 
under a wrong understanding or one of the 
crime’s material elements, he / she shall be 
exempted from punishment). Al-Halabi, Mo-
hammad Ali Al-Salim and Ayad. Ibid,  p.342.
40. Al-Refa’i,  Ahmad Abed Al-Hamid. 2004. The 
general rule of the international criminal lia-
bility, Doctoral dissertation. Cairo University, 
Egypt, p.160.
41. Awad, Mohammd Muhyi Al-Deen. Ibid, p. 
924 – 925. AndSudqi, Abed Al-Raheem. 
1986.The criminal international law, Al-Nah-
da Al-Arabeya Publishing and distribution 
house, Cairo, p.68.
42. The Jordanian Court of Cassation / Criminal 
Division. Judgment No. 79 / 76. The Journal 
of the Jordanian Bar Association, 1943, p. 
24. Al-Halabi, Mohammad Ali Al-Salim. Ibid, 
p.337.
43. Salameh, Ma’moun. Ibid, p.384. and Rama-
dan, Omar Al-Saeed. Ibid,  p.319.
44. Al-Refa’i, Ahmad Abed Al-Hamid. 2004. The 
general rule of the international criminal li-
ability, Doctoral dissertation. Cairo Univer-
sity, Egypt, p.16.
45. Al-Halabi, Mohammad Ali Al-Salim Ayad. 
Ibid, p.209.
46. I’baid, Hasanain Ibrahim. Ibid, p.89. and 
50
Awad, Mohammd Muhyi Al-Deen. Ibid, 
p.678. and Glasser, Stefan. 1957.  Infraction 
International, librariegénérale De Droit et 
De Jurisprudence, Paris, P.92.
47. Al-Far, Abed Al-Wahed. 1996. International 
offense and the jurisdiction it falls under. Al-
Nahda Al-Arabeya Publishing and distribu-
tion house. Cairo. p. 158
48. Shams Al-Deen, Ashraf Tawfiq. 1999.  The 
principles of the international criminal law, 
Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya Publishing and distri-
bution house, Cairo,  p. 110
49. Glasser, Stefan.  Infraction International, 
ibid, P.94.
50. Awad, Mohammd Muhyi Al-Deen. Ibid, 
p.678. and Al-Sa’di, Hameed. 1971.  Intro-
duction to international criminal law with 
reviewing and analyzing the judgments of 
the Nuremberg tribunal that were held for 
prosecuting major war criminals: A compar-
ative study between international offenses 
and their counterpart listed in the national 
law, 1st edition, Al-Ma’aref publishing and 
distribution house. Baghdad. p.299
51. Awad, Mohammd Muhyi Al-Deen. ibid, 
p.679. and Al-Sa’di, Hameed. ibid, p. 299.
52. Awad, Mohammd Muhyi Al-Deen. ibid, 
p.679. and Shams Al-Deen, Ashraf  Tawfiq. 
ibid, p.113.
53. Husny, Mahmoud Najeeb. Lessons about 
the International Criminal Law, ibid, p.112.
54. Article 33 / 1 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court. Yaacov, Nomi Ba. 
Command Responsibility, Crimes Of War 
Project>The Book, 28/5/2005, By Site: www.
crimesofwar.org/thebook/command-re-
spon.htm.
55. Abed Al-Rahman, Isma’il. 2000. The protec-
tion of civilians under the criminal laws in 
the light of the spread of armed conflicts: 
An analytical and etymological study, A 
doctoral dissertation, Faculty of law, Man-
soura University, Egypt, p. 259.
56. Abed Al-Rahman, Isma’il. ibid, p.259.
57. Hejazi, Abed Al-Fatah Bayomi. ibid, p. 186.
58. Al-Far, Abed Al-Wahed. ibid, p. 150. Shams.
Al-Deen, Ashraf Tawfiq. ibid, p. 76.
59. Stefani, Gaston. Levasseur, Georges. Bouloc, 
Bernard, Op.Cit, P.305.
60. Salameh, Ma’moun. ibid, p. 230.
61. Al-Halabi, Mohammad Ali Al-Salim Ayad. 
ibid, p. 180.
62. I’baid, Hasanain. 1999. The international of-
fense. Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya Publishing and 
distribution house. Cairo. p.43.
63. Al-Sa’di, Hameed. ibid, p. 279.
64. Khalaf, Mohammad Mahmoud. 1973. The 
self-defense right under the International 
Criminal law. Doctoral Dissertation. Faculty 
of Law. Cairo University, Egypt,  p. 113. and 
Rassat, Mechéle. Droit Pénal, Op.Cit, P.415.
65. Awad, Mohammd Muhyi Al-Deen. Studies in 
the criminal international law, ibid, p. 655.
66. Abed Al-Khaliq, Mohammad Abed Al-
Men’em. International crimes, ibid, P.94.
67. Helmi, Nabil Ahmad. International terrorism 
under the rules of the public international 
law. Al-Nahda Al-Arabeya Publishing and 
distribution house. Cairo. The year of issuing 
it wasn’t specified. p. 90. and I’baid, Hasan-
ain Ibrahim. The international offense, ibid, 
p.63.
68. Khalaf, Mohammad Mahmoud. The self-de-
fense right under the International Criminal 
law. Ibid, p. 232 - 234.
69. Helmi, Nabil Ahmad. International terrorism 
under the rules of the public international 
law. Ibid, p. 91.
70. Khalaf, Mohammad Mahmoud. The self-de-
fense right under the International Criminal 
law. Ibid, p.216.
71. Husny, Mahmoud Najeeb. Lessons about 
the International Criminal Law. Ibid,  p. 86.
72. Shams Al-Deen, Ashraf Tawfiq.  Ibid, p. 181.
73. Husny, Mahmoud Najeeb. Lessons about 
the International Criminal Law. Ibid, p.49.
74. Khalaf, Mohammad Mahmoud. The self-de-
fense right under the International Criminal 
law. p. 448.
The Jordanian Court of Cassation decided that 
self-defense is a substantive issue and the con-
cerned court has the right to assess the legiti-
51
macy of the defense act in accordance with the 
evidence and circumstances. This does not fall 
under the jurisdiction of the cassation court in 
case the evidence is valid and provides the court 
with the reliable facts that make the judgment 
sounds logical (The Jordanian Court of Cassation 
/ criminal division. Judgment No. 73 / 77 / issued 
on: 2/8/1973). Al-Halabi, Mohammad Ali Al-Salim 
Ayad. Ibid, p.185.
75. Khalaf, Mohammad Mahmoud., ibid, p 449. 
And I’baid, Hasanain Ibrahim, The interna-
tional offense, ibid, p.73.
76. I’baid, Hasanain Ibrahim,  ibid, p.77. and 
Glasser, Stefan. Infraction International, ibid, 
P.76.
77. Helmi,Nabil Ahmad. Ibid, p 95.
78. Awad, MohammdMuhyi Al-Deen. ibid. p. 
675.
79. Abed Al-Rahman, Isma’il, Ibid, p. 270.
80. Basyoni, Mahmoud Sharif. 2004. The inter-
national criminal court, The Higher Institute 
for Human Rightsat DePaul University, Al-
Shorouq Publishing and distribution house, 
p. 237-238.

